We Really Gotta Stop Keeping Smallpox in Random Boxes in the CDC: Reasons Why

We've discussed a lot in class why we should just eliminate our last stashes of eradicated viruses. For example, we have smallpox samples in Russia and in Atlanta. They also found a couple of vials of still-live smallpox in a random locked fridge in the National Institute of Health. Thankfully no one became infected, but it was a distinct possibility. For diseases as dangerous as smallpox, completely wiping them off of the face of the Earth is the safest option. I understand the nuclear equivalent argument (if Russia has them, we should too), but storing the virus in the US in any capacity isn't helping us at all it is just increasing the possibility for human error the longer it is present here. And it isn't just smallpox. According to the FDA, hundreds of unintended exposures to biological (and disease-causing) factors occur a year. Not all of these involve smallpox or other infectious agents that can eliminate millions off of the face of the Earth, but you only need one mistake with a dangerous virus to release it into the US. Thankfully, the Center of Disease control and the NIH (among others) do a good job of preventing the spread of these diseases after the mistake has been made (see the smallpox exposure in Britain in the 1980s when 1 woman died and 300 were preventatively hospitalized) but it is a matter of time before we make a mistake we can't contain.

And on that happy note, here is my article!
https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/3/20/18260669/deadly-pathogens-escape-lab-smallpox-bird-flu
Anja Zehfuss